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I. INTRODUCTION 
COMES NOW, Appellants, Western Community Insurance Co. ("Western 
Community") and DNJ, Inc. ("DNJ"), and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35(c), hereby 
submit their Reply Brief in reply to Respondent Burks Tractor Co. ("Burks") and 
Respondent Krone, NA Inc. ' s ("Krone") Respondent Briefs. 
II. ARGUMENT 
A. The Subrogation Clause and Idaho Code § 48-601 Established Western 
Community's Right to Assert Claims for Actual Damages under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. 
In their Respondent Briefs, both Burks and Krone first assert that the abuse of 
discretion standard of review is the proper legal standard for this Court's review of the 
district court' s December 18, 2014 Memorandum and Order Re: Motions to Dismiss 
("Memorandum Order") dismissing Plaintiffs ' claims under the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act ("ICP A"). As discussed in more detail in Appellants' Brief, Appellants 
sought to file their First Amended Complaint ("F AC") amending the ICP A allegations 
previously dismissed by the district court to more specifically support Western 
Community' s right to bring claims under the ICPA as the subrogee ofDNJ. R. Vol. I., pp. 
5, 52. As alleged in Appellants ' proposed FAC, Western Community was the Subrogee of 
DNJ's right to recover for the loss of the Krone Chopper against Krone under the 
subrogation provision of its insurance policy with DNJ. 
Appellants do not dispute that the grant or denial of leave to amend after a 
1 
responsive pleading has been filed is a matter that is within the discretion of the trial court 
and is subject reversal on appeal only for an abuse of that discretion." DAFCO LLC v. 
Stewart Guar. Co. 156 Idaho 749, 755, 331 P.3d 491 (2014) (quoting Black Canyon 
Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat. Bank, N A. 119 Idaho 171 , 175, 804 P.2d 900, 
904 (1991)). Even the abuse of discretion standard, however, urged by Respondents 
requires, inter alia, that the district court acted "consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it." Id. 
The interpretation of a contract begins with the language of the contract itself. 
Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 P.3d 743, 747 (2007). If 
the language of the contract is unambiguous, then its meaning and legal effect must be 
determined from its words. Id. When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, 
its interpretation and legal effect are questions oflaw. State v. Barnett, 133 Idaho 231 , 234, 
985 P .2d 111, 114 ( 1999). The district court made no finding that the subrogation clause at 
issue was ambiguous, so the interpretation and legal effect of the clause is a question of 
law. 
Western Community sought to amend its Complaint to include claims under the 
ICPA under the following subrogation clause of its insurance policy with DNJ: 
COM1\1ERCIAL INLAND MARINE CONDITIONS: Provision J-Transfer 
of Rights of Recovery Against Others to Us . If any person or organization to 
or for whom we make payment under this coverage part has rights to recover 
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damages from another, those rights are transferred to us to the extent of our 
payment. 
Here, the district court denied Appellants' request to amend the Complaint to include 
the ICPA claims on the grounds that the amended ICPA claims were not valid claims . R. 
Vol. I., pp. 53 , 58-59 . As discussed in more detail in Appellants ' Brief, the basis for 
this ruling by the district court was that the "boilerplate" subrogation clause in the 
insurance policy at issue was inadequate to transfer DNJ' s ICP A claims for 
damages to Western Community. Id. Instead, the district court found that the 
language of the subrogation clause must contain "the express transfer or assignment 
of statutory ICPA rights from the insured to the insurer .... " in order for ICPA claims for 
damages to be transferred from the insured to their surety. R. Vol. I., pp. 58-59. The 
district court ' s denial of Appellants ' Motion to Amend was based entirely on its 
finding that the subrogation clause at issue was "exactly the type of generic boilerplate 
subrogation clause that the Washington Court of Appeals found insufficient in Trinity 
Universal Ins. Co. of Kansas v. Ohio Ins. Co, 312 P.3d 976, 986 (Wash.Ct. App. 2013)." 
Id. 
Idaho Code § 48-601 states that one of the express purposes of the ICP A is to 
protect consumers and businesses from unfair or deceptive acts and practices in the 
conduct of trade or commerce. Idaho Code § 48-608 expressly authorizes the recovery of 
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actual damages for the purchasers of goods from those who have violated the ICP A. As 
alleged, Western Community had paid DNJ $440,779.00 for its loss of the Krone Chopper 
and Western Community' s proposed claims under the ICPA were pled as alternative 
theories of recovery for this amount after Respondents refused to submit and accept DNJ's 
warranty claims. R. Vol. I., pp.23-26. The Washington appellate court decision in Trinity 
was dependent upon its finding that Trinity had made no payments for the damages it 
sought to recover under the Washington Consumer Protection Act. Trinity, 312 P.3d at 
986. 
The $440,779.00 represented the actual loss paid to DNJ that Western Community 
was entitled to recover as damages under the language of the subrogation clause expressly 
providing that "if any person or organization to or for whom we make payment under this 
coverage part has rights to recover damages from another, those rights are transferred to us 
to the extent of our payment." Tr. Vol. I, p. 368, L. 13-p. 378, 1. 8; R. Vol. I., pp. 58-59. The 
language of the subrogation clause at issue was clear and unambiguous and contained no 
language prohibiting Western Community from asserting all rights that DNJ had to recover 
damages for the loss of the Krone Chopper. 
Nor did the Idaho law of subrogation prohibit or otherwise limit Western 
Community' s rights to assert DNJ's subrogated claims for damages under the ICPA. As 
discussed in more detail in Appellants ' Brief, the Idaho common law doctrine of 
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subrogation encompasses the complete substitution of the subrogor's rights in the 
subrogee. International Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial Park Company, 
107 Idaho 1116, 1119 695 P. 2d 1255, 1258 (1985). 
· The District Court further erred by applying the Washington Appellate Court's 
interpretation of the Washington Consumer Protection Act instead of simply analyzing the 
plain language of Idaho Code § 48-602(1 ). "The determination of the meaning of a statute 
and its application is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review." 
Woodburn v. Manco, 137 Idaho 502, 504, 50 P.3d 997, 999 (2002). The words must be 
given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning, and the statute must be construed as a 
whole. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). The Court's primary 
duty in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislative intent and purpose of the 
statute. Adamson v. Blanchard, 133 Idaho 602, 605, 990 P.2d 1213, 1216 (1999); Bannock 
County v. City of Pocatello, 110 Idaho 292, 294, 715 P .2d 962, 964 (1986). 
Idaho Code§ 48-602(1) provides: 
"Person" means natural persons, corporations both foreign and domestic, 
trusts, partnerships both limited and general, incorporated or unincorporated 
associations, companies, trusts, business entities, and any other legal entity, 
or any other group associated in fact although not a legal entity or any agerit, 
assignee, heir, employee, representative or servant thereof. 
Under LC. § 48-602(1) the definition of "Person" in the ICPA includes 
corporations, companies, business entities and any other legal entities. Clearly, DNJ as an 
Idaho corporation had the right to bring a cause of action under LC. § 48-608(1) for 
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violations ofldaho Code§§ 48-603(5) and (7) . Respondent Krone asserts that the language 
in I.C. § 48-602(1) stating that "although not a legal entity or any agent, assignee, heir, 
employee, representative or servant thereof' was intended as a limitation prohibiting legal 
entities, agents , heirs, employees and their representatives and servants from asserting 
claims under the ICP A. This assertion is contradicted by the plain language of Idaho Code 
§ 48-602(1) which is clearly intended to include and not exclude "any other group" 
associated in fact with a provision even if they are not a legal entity, agent, etc. 
In reliance upon this mis-interpretation of I.C. § 48-602(1), Respondent Krone 
asserts that the ICP A allows for claims from actual purchasers but expressly prohibits them 
from "a legal entity" and, therefore, does not allow ICP A claims to be asserted by any 
entity other than the actual purchaser. The language relied upon by Respondent Krone, 
when properly read in context, is clearly meant to be inclusive and not exclusive. 
Respondent Krone ' s reliance upon express limitations in other state consumer protection 
acts containing express limitations is, therefore incorrect. When read in context, the 
inclusive language of I.C. § 48-602(1) clearly supported Western Community' s right to 
assert DNJ's claims for actual damages under the ICPA. 
While an ICP A claim is dependent upon the existence of an express contractual 
agreement, it was Burks, and not Krone, that was claiming that it was in privity of contract 
with DNJ under the Purchase and Sale Agreement at the time the district court denied 
Appellants ' Motion to Amend. On remand, the "new fact" that Krone and not Burks was 
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the owner of the Krone Chopper at the time of the sale (discussed in more detail below) can 
be addressed simply by alleging Krone, and not Burks, was in privity of contract with DNJ 
on the New Equipment Warranty with Burks serving as Krone ' s agent. 
Both Respondents assert that it was harmless error for the district court to deny 
Appellants' request to assert the ICPA claims because the jury found against Appellants on 
the underlying warranty claims. This assertion ignores the evidence at trial that Krone and 
its agent DNJ engaged in deceptive and unfair trade practices by providing and selling 
warranties with the Krone Chopper but refusing to submit or allow DNJ to submit a claim 
under either warranty. At trial, Krone representative Ken Stratton confirmed that the only 
way that a purchaser of a Krone Chopper could submit a claim seeking warranty coverage 
was for the dealer to submit the claim through the electronic "KWS" system accessible 
only by Krone dealers. Tr. Vol. I, p. 681 , L. 5-p. 689, 1. 3 . 
One of the owners of Burks, Doug Burks, testified that Mr. Stratton had refused to 
allow Burks to submit a warranty claim on the KWS system: 
Q. Mr. Burks, when we left off, I believe you were testifying about 
communications from Krone regarding the submission of a warranty claim in 
this case; is that correct? 
A. Repeat your question. 
Q. I will. And let me ask another question, actually. Is it your understanding 
that, based on your previous testimony, that at some point in time Burks was 




Q. How did you gain that understanding? Do you recall who you spoke to? 
A. It was a letter. 
Q. And it-
A. It was sent to our warranty clerk, Teresa Heinman. Actually, it was an 
e-mail. 
Q. Okay. And so do you remember who the e-mail was from? 
A. From Ken Stratton. 
Q. Okay. So you didn't have a conversation with Mr. Stratton, but you 
reviewed an e-mail -
A. Correct. 
Q. - in which - I'm sorry. 
A. I'm sorry. 
Q. Not at all - in which he advised Burks not to file a warranty claim? 
A. Correct. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 631, 1. 9-p. 632, 1. 13. 
This evidence supported Respondents' claim that Krone was engaging in deceptive 
and unfair trade practices by providing and selling warranties for which it refused to even 
allow purchasers to submit warranty claims. In addition to supporting Appellants' ICPA 
claims, these allegations, in combination with a jury instruction covering the ICP A 
standards and claims may also have convinced the jurors to reconsider whether Krone was 
acting in bad faith in relation to Appellants' warranty claims. 
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Instead of relying upon the factually inapposite case law from the Washington 
appellate court in Trinity, the district court should have simply applied the unambiguous 
language of the subrogation clause and Idaho Code § 48-602(1) and found that Western 
Community was entitled to assert ICPA claims for the recovery ofDNJ's actual damages 
based on the loss of the Krone Chopper. Its failure to do so was error and should be 
reversed here on appeal. 
B. Appellants' Right to a Fair Trial was Prejudiced by the District Court's 
Decision to Allow Respondents to Assert New Factual and Legal Defenses only 
Days before Trial. 
Respondents both assert that Appellants should be precluded from asserting that 
their right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the district court's decision allowing 
Respondents to assert new factual and legal privity defenses on the eve of trial because 
Appellants failed to conduct discovery on this issue. As discussed in detail in Appellants' 
Brief, the new factual assertion of ownership of the Krone Chopper by Krone, not Burks, 
took place at a hearing on the parties' Motions in Limine on March 24, 2016. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
6, l. 7-p. 75, l. 75. At this hearing, counsel for Respondent Krone advised the district court: 
The other thing I should say is, at least at to the manufacturer's warranty, we 
have learned something here in the last month that I think the court ought to 
be aware of. Before the last month we understood that the Krone, this 
particular chopper machine, was sold to Burks and then sold to DNJ. Mr. 
Brady did some research on this, got down on it; and it was actually sold 
directly from Krone to DNJ, and so what we know about this argument is, 
there's no privity now between Burks and DNJ, and so this extra warranty 
representation is no longer relevant, for that additional reason. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 12, l. 15-p. 13, l. 3 
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Counsel for Respondent Burks then followed up on Krone's representation during 
the following discussion with the district court: 
And as Mr. Dupont indicated, we now have the ownership issue of the Krone 
chopper established. Krone owned the chopper. Therefore, there was a privity of 
contract between Krone and DNJ because Krone was the owner of the chopper at 
the time it was sold. 
So I would like to basically bring that front and center, because we think that 
basically, in view of the ownership issue and the privity issue being resolved and 
the fact that Krone is now primarily liable for the warranty, that Burks Tractor 
probably is not a necessary party in this case anymore. 
THE COURT: is that a motion in limine or a motion for summary judgment? 
MR. BRADY: Well, I think- how about a motion for clarification? Is that a better 
way of putting it? 
THE COURT: Well, okay. All right. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 12, 11. 11-17; p. 19, 1. 18-p. 20, 1. 5. 
At the conclusion of the March 24, 2016 hearing, the district then denied what it 
described as "essentially" Burks' motion for summary judgment: 
Burks Tractor's verbal motion essentially for summary judgment is denied at 
this stage. I think it is untimely as made orally today. It certainly could be a 
motion for trial. But as of today, I deny that, that motion. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 70, 11. 14-19. 
Prior to the March 24, 2016 hearing, Respondents had maintained throughout the 
discovery and pre-trial proceedings that Burks and not Krone was the owner of the Krone 
Chopper at the time it was sold to DNJ. R. Vol. I., p. 179. As discussed in Appellants' 
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Brief, the Regional Business Manager for the Western Region of Respondent Krone, Ken 
Stratton, had sworn under oath during the summary judgment proceedings that the Krone 
Chopper was owned by Burks at the time of the sale. R. Vol. I., p. 179. Respondents' 
assertion that their last-minute claim of ownership of the Krone Chopper by Krone, not 
Burks, was not prejudicial because Appellants failed to conduct discovery on this issue is 
inherently flawed. Instead of supporting their position that Appellants' right to a fair trial 
was not prejudiced by this late disclosure, this argument highlights that it was Respondents 
who failed to disclose the information they relied upon to change their factual and legal 
positions throughout the discovery process. In addition to their failure to properly disclose 
this information during discovery, Respondents submitted inaccurate sworn testimony 
during the summary judgment proceedings stating that Burks was the owner of Krone 
Chopper at the time of the sale. On this record, Respondents' assertion that their late 
disclosure of the information regarding the ownership of the Krone Chopper was due to 
Appellants' failure to conduct discovery on this issue is absurd. 
Burks' new Affirmative Defenses based on of lack of privity were not pled until 
March 29, 2016, just over three business days prior to trial. The district court's Order 
allowing Respondents to assert their new factual assertions and resulting legal defenses at 
trial was not made until April 5, 2016 the morning of the first day of trial. In its ruling 
permitting Respondents to assert their new factual and legal defenses, the district court 
stated: 
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As to Burks, there are a number of new affirmative defense stated at page six 
of their newest answer. They deal, as has been pointed out by Mr. Brady, 
with the privity question, assertions that no one from Burks made any 
warranties, direct or implied I believe was one of them, and that DNJ, 
claiming DNJ did not rely on any of Burks' representations in terms of the 
warranty, I find those not to be so much defenses, a la fail [sic] to mitigate 
damages, bad faith, laches as they are just factual assertions that this - that 
facts are one way, or they're the other way. 
And so I decline to find prejudice to the plaintiff in terms of this filed answer. 
I decline to strike it. I will allow the third filed - or the answer to the third 
amended complaint filed by Burks on March 29th to remain as I have allowed 
for Krone. 
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 91, 1. 19-p.92, 1.7; p. 92, 11. 20-25. 
Having previously found that Respondents' change in their legal and factual 
positions was essentially a motion for summary judgment, the district court allowed 
Respondents to file their Answers asserting these new factual allegations and legal 
defenses on the eve of trial. Combined with the district court's failure to then provide an 
agency jury instruction to alleviate at least some of the prejudice caused by Respondents' 
untimely assertion of their new factual and legal defenses, Appellants' right to a fair trial 
was prejudiced. The district court's denial of Appellants' Motion for New Trial should be 
reversed and the case remanded. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and the Record before the Court, Appellants respectfully 
request that this Court remand this case to the district court for a new trial and award 
Appellants their attorney fees incurred in bringing this Appeal. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of April 2017. 
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES 
By 
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